Abstract What are the outcomes for the poor of Vietnam's public safety net? Altho ugh centrally mandated, social welfare programs are locally implemented according to local norms and local poverty standards, and are often heavily reliant on local financing. This paper examines the coverage, incidence and horizontal equity of the programs that can be identified in the VNLSS data. The paper looks at the role of location in determining whether the poor are assisted nationally. Dynamic incidence between 1993 and 1998 is explored, as is the degree to which programs performed a safety net function. Coverage and payments to households are found to be low and to have had negligible impact on poverty. The impact of current outlays could in principle also be improved through better targeting. The system was also ineffective in protecting households who were vulnerable to shocks. Finally, although there is a greater concentration of poverty-related programs and household participation in poorer communes, the results suggest that more is spent absolutely and relatively on the poor in richer communes.
Introduction
Vietnam has a system of centrally determined and mandated poverty and social welfare programs that are implemented by local authorities according to local norms, local poverty standards, and in large part, local financing. Resources are scarce.
Although they may be intended to cover the mandates, insufficient central and provincial allocations may never even reach the communes. These central allocations must inevitably be supplemented by means of local resource mobilization. There is evidence that the rural population, and the poor among them, are heavily taxed including through numerous locally levied 'fees, charges and other contributions' (Government of Vietnam (GOV)-Donor Working Group 2000, Annex C). In addition, standards of "poverty" used by different authorities vary across locations often simply mirroring local resources. For these reasons, there is thought to be uneven coverage and leakage. The poorest in
Vietnam often need to rely on charity from within their communities. But the communities they live in are often poor, so that other households have little to spare. In this context too, it has been argued that coverage among Vietnam's poor may be quite uneven spatially, with poor people living in poor areas faring much worse than poor people in well-off areas (Rao et al. 1999 and van de Walle 1999) .
The decentralized nature of Vietnam's public safety net also raises wider concerns from recent literature (Bardhan and Mookerjee 2000 , Gallasso and Ravallion 2000 , Conning and Kevane 1999 . A popular argument in recent years is that decentralized programs are better at reaching the poor. The argument is essentially that local authorities are better placed to accurately identify and target poor people and their problems. Against that, counter arguments can also be made that local entities may not share the objectives of the central government and may be more liable to political capture. Arguments can clearly be made both ways.
In the light of these concerns  both specific to Vietnam and more general  this paper examines how well targeted existing programs and expenditures on poverty reduction in Vietnam are to poor communes and poor people. Surprisingly little is known about this. Cross-province regressions of budgetary allocations for health-and education-related national programs strongly suggest that transfers from the center are progressive in that they result in higher per capita spending in poor and middle income provinces (Fritzen 1999 ). Fritzen also finds that central health transfers are well targeted based on health needs. However, little is known about the within province allocations to districts and communes. Others have noted the lack of cross-commune redistribution of resources and the consequent disparities between communes in their ability to provide basic services and assistance to the local poor (Litvack 1999) . Moreover, nationally representative data on household specific program incidence has not been available for more than one or two programs. Fortunately new data from the 1997/98 Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VNLSS) enable an analysis of the incidence across households and communes of some social welfare and poverty-related initiatives and provide an opportunity to explore these concerns more rigorously. The availability of an earlier data set for 1992/93 also allows some comparisons over time including longitudinal comparison for the same households. There was more than a doubling of total spending on certain transfers between the two dates. This provides an interesting experiment in who benefited from the changes in outlays.
The main question the paper tries to address is whether current public social 3 welfare programs are targeted to the poor. 2 In trying to answer this question, the paper explores sensitivity to the definition of poverty and what is assumed about household behavioral responses to the programs. The paper examines whether programs perform a safety net function -recognizing that this involves both protection from poverty and promotion from poverty (Dreze and Sen 1989) . The paper also examines the role of nonincome factors, including whether equally poor communes in different provinces are treated equally and, if not, what accounts for these differences.
The next section discusses the setting, the overall system of poverty alleviation and safety net programs and their financing. Section 3 describes the data, while section 4 discusses welfare measurement. Implications for the incidence of program spending are addressed in section 5. Section 6 then looks at how much the system protects versus promotes the poor. The importance of factors other than welfare to incidence, including where one lives, is discussed in section 7. Section 8 concludes.
Background
Despite experiencing a large reduction in poverty since embracing the market economy in the late 1980s, Vietnam remains a poor country with more than one third of its population in poverty. Its population and poor are primarily rural, engaged in smallscale agricultural activities and subject to seasonality in incomes, recurring natural disasters and other important sources of vulnerability and impoverishment. Geographical differences and the existence of disadvantaged ethnic minority groups add to the complexity of the poverty picture. The country also faces severe budget constraints.
2 The paper's focus is on public transfers only. For a discussion of private inter-household transfers see Cox (2001) .
Yet, on paper at least, Vietnam has  by poor country standards  an extensive social security and safety net system. This reflects a strong historical commitment to combating inequa lity and raising the living standards of all its regions and people. The surviving concern and frequently expressed political commitment to ensuring a minimum level of welfare for all and maintaining a low variance in incomes also does much to preserve the regime's political legitimacy. But the government's aspirations in this area are often overshadowed by a lack of resources.
Doi Moi profoundly changed the way social services were delivered, leaving peasants more vulnerable (Kolko 1997, Glewwe and Litvack 1998) . Cooperatives that had financed and supported health and education services for their members, as well as insurance against shocks, were disbanded in 1988. The social protection system that has evolved since decollectivization is composed of a number of different initiatives that are centrally mandated but locally implemented, often relying heavily on local resources.
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The Social Security System provides pensions and other employment-related social insurance payments to formal sector workers. Public servants and armed forces personnel have been covered since 1947. In 1995, the scheme was expanded to private sector employees working in firms with 10 or more employees (MOLISA 1999) . Although these social insurance payments are employment-related and eventually meant to be fully funded from payroll taxes and employee contributions, they continue to be heavily subsidized by the central budget. Although transfers from the central budget appear to be insufficient to cover local needs or even centrally mandated spending, there is evidence that they are quite redistributive, aiming to equalize resources across provinces (Rao et al. 1999) . However, use of the funds and intra-provincial distribution are largely at the discretion of the provincial authorities. The evidence suggests that the redistributive process often breaks down at this level (Litvack 1999) . Provinces distribute resources to districts based on criteria that vary widely from one province to another. And similarly, districts distribute to communes in disparate ways. Certainly, there is great disparity in the resources available to communes. Expenditure mandates are sometimes ignored and sometimes funded from other recurrent transfers or locally mobilized resources ('contributions').
There is often pressure on the communes to raise the resources to implement central programs through charging various fees and levying 'voluntary contributions' from their populations. Communes are likely to contribute their own additiona l resources depending on several factors including the economic status of households in the commune, and local leadership. But it is likely that the most needy communes are often the ones that are least able to mobilize local funds. Existing fiscal arrangements which, at least for some programs, ensure progressive redistribution to poor provinces are, nevertheless likely to lead to low and uneven coverage and horizontal inequity due to the lack of central incentives or mandates for targeting the poor within provinces. Statistics published by MOLISA (1999) show the large gap between the numbers of eligible for each of the social welfare programs and the actual numbers of beneficiaries. The probability of participation is likely to depend on local budgets and leadership and hence, on where one lives.
In exploring the implications for the poor of the existing safety net in Vietnam, this paper emphasizes a number of concerns. One issue relates to defining 'the poor'.
The paper uses per capita consumption expenditures as its general welfare measure, but recognizes that some components of the observed household consumption data reflect public transfers. This has implications for drawing conclusions about the counterfactual of what welfare would have been without transfers, and hence, about the incidence of transfers. The paper describes a method for dealing with this concern.
A second issue concerns how the safety net performed over time. In principle, a safety net can reduce poverty either by protecting no n-poor people from becoming poor or by promoting poor people out of poverty. How does Vietnam's existing safety net perform in both functions? With panel data, methods exist to address this question (Ravallion et al. 1995) . These methods are applied to Vietnam's safety net.
A final question concerns possible determinants of program incidence other than consumption expenditures. One possibility is that interventions are aimed at non-income dimensions of welfare so that the incidence picture based on consumption gives a skewed view of targeting. Another possibility is that, given public institutional arrangements for delivering social welfare programs, one may find that non-welfare -in particular, political and geographical -factors matter a great deal to whether transfers reach the poor. In this respect, it may not be poverty that attracts benefits but rather, the 
There are a number of potential problems with estimating β directly with this equation. A number of alternative specifications are run to test for these possibilities. A double differencing model where all variables are expressed in first differences is used to purge the estimate of fixed effects and deal with the first source of endogeneity. Equation (1) is then:
Since there are only two rounds of data, the term A number of variables are found to be significant  changes in household size and in the language of interview have a negative impact, while an older head and a higher educational level influence consumption positively. 7 The β estimate is 0.37 (t=3.6), and not significantly different from the initial simple double difference estimate.
To deal with possible omitted variables that alter over time and affect transfers, 7 The regression controls for changes in household size and composition -in particular, the number of members in the 0 to 6 and 7 to 16 age groups, the number of women and men over 55 and 60 respectively (the formal sector legal retirement age) -a change in the highest grade completed by the most educated member of the household, the change in the age and gender of the household head and finally a change in the language of interview. Households had the option of being interviewed in a language other than the majority Kinh in both survey years. See van de Walle (2001) 
Incidence of Poverty-Related Programs
The paper now turns to evidence from the 1998 VNLSS on the incidence of programs and policies aimed at raising living standards. The focus is squarely on the distributional impacts and who's getting how much. In reality, these programs serve noted other objectives  such as assisting those who contributed to and suffered from the war effort or the elderly  that one may want to take into account when assessing whether to expand or contract them. At the same time, it is often argued that there is a coincidence of objectives and that some of the larger Funds -particularly social subsidies -are quite pro-poor. Substantial public resources are spent on these programs and while poverty may not be their sole objective, it is important to ask how much is reaching the poor.
In Table 1 , individuals are ranked into national population quintiles on the basis of their household per capita expenditures -net of half of current transfer receipts as discussed in section 4. 11 The table presents real monetary amounts per capita of various types of public transfers received by households during the 12 months prior to the survey.
Amounts are expressed averaged over each quintile's population  recipient and nonrecipient. Percentages of the population living in households where at least one member benefited from these transfers are given in Table 2 . In general, outlays are small and there is weak coverage.
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The largest payments are from the social insurance fund, covering pension and disability benefits for civil servants and SOE employees. As a result, one would expect these payments to be more widespread in urban areas and not to be particularly pro-poor.
They are predominant in urban areas where 18.3 percent of the population live in households where someone received these payments in 1998 (Table 2 ). Yet, per capita amounts from this source are by far largest for the poor in urban areas. In rural areas, by 11 I will refer to these as net quintiles. 12 The official January 1998 exchange rate was about VND12,290 to the US dollar.
contrast, the amounts received rise steadily with levels of living. This program also touches the greatest number of people of any program (11.2 percent nationally).
Social subsidies, which include payments to veterans and the families of war martyrs, as well as to those unable to support themselves, are much smaller in absolute amounts. These programs are often claimed to be reaching the poor in Vietnam. Per capita amounts are largest for those in the poorest quintile in urban areas. In rural areas, the poorest quintile follows the top quintile with the second largest per capita amounts.
In general, receipts are much more even across expenditure levels than for social insurance benefits. Interestingly, mean payments are larger in rural areas, though coverage is relatively similar across the sectors.
Actual individual social insurance and subsidy payments are found to vary widely across recipient households. For example, social insurance outlays range from 49,252 to 21,500,000 and social subsidy outlays from 14,264 to 8,645,464 Dongs per year. It should be noted that some of this variance is expected. For one, the survey does not allow identification of recipients. Some households may have more than one beneficiary.
Furthermore, social insurance payments consist of pensions but also disability payments which are likely to be lower than the former. Government-set minimum Regular Relief transfers also vary across the different types of potential beneficiaries (MOLISA 1999).
The survey also asked about transfers received under policies or programs supported by the government's education scholarship program, its poverty alleviation efforts, and transfers received from NGOs. Few scholarships are awarded (141 were reported in the sample). Their incidence is regressive: the top quintile has the largest share of recipients as well as the highest per capita amounts in both rural and urban areas.
However, the urban population in the bottom quintile is also notable for having the second highest incidence of beneficiaries. In general, scholarships benefit a larger share of the urban than rural population. Per capita amounts are also higher in urban areas.
The amounts involved in the poverty alleviation and NGO funds are negligible:
equivalent to approximately $0.22 per person per year (1998 official exchange rate) in the case of poverty alleviation funds and $0.08 from NGOs for the quintile with the largest receipts. The little money there is appears to be moderately well-targeted in rural areas, in that per capita amounts fall with higher quintiles. However, there is also evidence of capture by the well-off since all quintiles get something. This is more pronounced in urban areas for both poverty and NGO transfers.
Finally, expressing all transfers together as a share of household per capita expenditures indicates progressive overall incidence in both rural and urban areas.
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Transfers to the urban poor in the bottom national quintile account for 35 percent of their consumption -quite a contrast with the poorest in rural areas for whom transfers account for 7.3 percent. Nonetheless, it is clear that income from social welfare programs account for only a small percentage of consumption expenditures overall.
The low average amounts received from social welfare in Table 1 could reflect either low coverage or low monetary amounts among those covered. Table 2 provides information on percentages of the population in each sub-group whose household received social welfare transfers (as discussed in Table 1 ). The patterns across quintiles are what one would expect following the discussion of Table 1 . Only 2.2% of the population (2.6 and 0.8% of the rural and urban populations respectively) belong to households who received assistance under a poverty program. This rises to a maximum of 6.6% for the poorest rural quintile. These figures may well underestimate the coverage of poverty programs if households do not know the source of assistance. Nevertheless, the data suggest very limited coverage. Table 3 further shows the urban bias of spending on these programs. Although only 22 percent of the population and less than 6 percent of the poor lived in urban areas in 1998, 46 percent of total spending goes to urban areas.
One important initiative under the education-related national programs has been targeted exemptions from paying school fees and other contributions. Such exemptions appear to be received by children attending all levels of education, but most commonly primary, followed by secondary, schooling. Since primary school fees were abolished in 1993 (Behrman and Knowles 1999) , the exemptions being picked up by the VNLSS98 and received by primary school kids must cover other school expenditures. Table 4 presents percentages of the population living in households with at least one child benefiting from exemptions across quintiles, as well as the reasons given for being exempted. Unfortunately, the data do not allow a calculation of the pecuniary benefit of the fee discharges. Exemptions can be partial or total. In the VNLSS sample, there were only 862 households who had at least one recipient child, though many had more than one. One thousand children benefited from partial exemptions and 571 from total exemptions. In both urban and rural areas, more partial than total exemptions are bestowed -3.7% versus 2.1% of the rural population and 1.8% versus 0.7% of the urban. There are clear indications that total exemptions are better targeted than partial ones. This can also be seen in the reasons given for receiving the exemption. Of the reasons listed in the questionnaire, unspecified 'other' is the most common for partial exemptions in both urban and rural areas (see below for further explanation). This is followed by living in a remote or mountainous region and having a parent who is a disabled soldier or cadre in rural areas, and the latter and being poor in urban areas. In contrast, living in a remote or mountainous region is the most commonly given reason for receiving the total exemption in rural areas, fo llowed by being from an ethnic minority and poor. In urban areas, poverty is given as the main reason and is given as a reason across all quintiles. For example, 35% of exemptions received in the fourth quintile give poverty as the reason. Targeting exe mptions to the children of disabled soldiers or cadres primarily benefits the richest groups in both sectors. However, 33% of all reasons in rural and 43% in urban areas were given as 'other.' 14 Table 4 shows the incidence of school fee exemptions to be mildly pro-poor.
Similar conclusions are reached when the incidence is instead expressed across the percentage of children 6 to 14 across consumption quintiles (p.145, GOV-Donor Working Group 2000). However, as noted by Behrman and Knowles (1999) school fees account for only a small share of total school-related expenditures and have a negligible impact on poverty outcomes.
Households in Vietnam are expected to make cash or in kind contributions to a myriad number of funds, associations and national causes. Table 5 provides some information about average household per capita annual contributions to their commune's labor and local security and police funds, and to mass associations. These are the funds for which the household survey collected information, but represent just some among the 14 Other (not individually recorded) reasons for receiving exemptions included: being a student at a pedagogic college; being an excellent student, a class monitor, the children of teachers, the children of officers and workers for whom tuition is paid for by the parent's work; and households with 2 or more children attending school (GSO communication).
many payments households make. Such funds collect fees that are earmarked for particular services. For example, contributions to the labor fund can be made in labor time, cash or kind and are intended to finance road maintenance and small construction works in the commune. With the exception of the labor fund in rural areas, absolute amounts generally rise with levels of living for all categories. As a share of household expenditures they are still moderately regressive for the rural population but they are income neutral for the urban population at a consistent 0.4% of expenditures across quintiles. Strikingly, more is paid per capita by all but the top quintile in rural areas. This is driven by much higher contributions to the labor fund by the rural population.
A much larger percentage of the population makes contributions to one of the three funds (for which there is self-reported information) than benefit from social welfare income. In rural areas, this varies from 70% of the population, to 54 and 49 for the labor fund, security fund and associations respectively. Compulsory contributions of 10 labor days a year for able-bodied adults within a certain age range has been a long time tradition in Vietnam. With the introduction of the market economy, the labor contribution has been partly or fully replaced by a cash or in-kind contribution in some regions. A national ordinance specifies the money amounts to be paid for each work day and details a number of characteristics that exempt individuals either temporarily or permanently.
The 1998 VNLSS asked the household both about the time given in labor and the cash and in kind payments made by family members during the last year. The data, as well as other sources suggest that there is liberal interpretation of the national ordinance at local level. For example, a study of 6 communes in 3 provinces found the time obligation to vary between 10 and 15 days and the cash alternative to be between VND 3,400 to 10,000 per day (GOV-Donor Working Group 2000, Annex C). Imputed labor time is added to the cash and in kind contributions to give the total payments to the labor fund presented in Table 5 . Participation in the labor fund decreases with increasing living standards in rural areas. The picture is quite different in urban areas. In all quintiles a smaller percentage contribute to the labor fund than in rural areas and participation rises with expenditures from 25% of the poorest to 42% of the top quintile. A large percentage contribute to local security (59% overall) and the more so the higher the quintile. 57% of the urban population also contributed to associations over the last year. For these contributory "funds" coverage appears reasonably wide, though average amounts contributed among those contributing are clearly low. As noted however, the charges reviewed account for just part of the amounts levied from households. A recent study suggests that in aggregate they can be quite burdensome as a share of household expenditures. Conversely, they clearly play a crucial role in commune level budgets (GOV-Donor Working Group 2000, Annex C). Poverty programs are the most common. These were active at the time of the survey in communes covering 80% of the population and 84% of the poor. However, they were slightly more common in small towns where 83% of the entire population, and 86% of the poor, were covered. Employment generation, sanitation and clean water, and education and culture projects also reached a larger proportion of small town residents than rural ones. By contrast, public health and infrastructure development programs covered more of the rural population. Disaster relief was also received in communes covering 65% of the non-urban population. Finally, infrastructure investments are extremely widespread covering communes containing 92% of the rural, and 78% of the small town populations. In both sectors, roads and schools are the most common investments. In rural communes, both tend to benefit larger percentages of the better-off.
In the programs reviewed in Tables 6 and 7 there is some evidence of targeting the poorer population groups. Disaster relief, for example, is received by the communes of a greater percentage of poor than non-poor households. However, based on these data, it is not possible to judge whether relative to needs, disaster relief would still appear welltargeted. Many of the other programs are thought to be geographically targeted to government-identified 'poor and remote' communes. Yet, on the whole the impression is one of programs being spread widely across expenditure groups and the rural population ge nerally. This may reflect problems in identifying the poor through the current 'poor and remote' commune classification, corroborating the results of Minot and Baulch (2001) . It could also indicate that communes are heterogeneous in terms of levels of living and that geographical targeting may be an inefficient way to help the poor. Of course, these tabulations tell us nothing about the magnitude or impact of the programs.
Careful evaluation of Vietnam's various poverty program disbursements must be made to better understand what does and does not work. However, the data reviewed both at household and commune level suggests a government preference for programs that are community-based rather than targeted to households. Transfers to households are negligible and coverage is weak. By contrast, the data indicate substantial community based programs and investments. Again, how much is being spent is unclear, as is the impact of the latter programs. However, as assessed by incidence across per capita expenditure quintiles, such interventions appear to be only weakly targeted to Vietnam's poor. The data suggest that transfers are redistributive, but not particularly well targeted in that, in general, the poor receive less in absolute amounts than the non-poor.
Protection versus promotion
As can be seen in net. An important role for the public sector in a poor rural economy like Vietnam is to provide protection for those who are vulnerable to poverty due to uninsured shocks. The preceding incidence picture is uninformative about whether transfers perform such a safety net function. The static incidence may not seem particularly well-targeted, but it may be deceptive about the degree to which outlays, coverage, and changes over time,
were perhaps correlated to poverty related shocks and changes in exogenous variables.
We have already seen the considerable variability in payment amounts across recipients.
There is also much instability over time in who gets transfers. For example, out of a total of 744 and 769 panel households who respectively got social insurance or social subsidy outlays in one of the two years, only 402 and 111 got them in both years. Does this reflect a response to changing household circumstances on the part of the system? This section examines social welfare incomes from this perspective.
When using the panel to study the incidence of the changes in social income, there is a question of how one should rank households in deciding who is 'poor'. Table 8 ranks households by three different definitions of welfare, which can be loosely referred to as denoting the initial, new, and long-term poor -namely per capita expenditures (net of half of transfers) in the initial period, the same in the later period and by the mean over both years -and presents a comparison of mean per capita social income receipts in both years. The proportional gains from expansion were pretty uniform across groups.
However, among the 'poor' in each of the three senses, the 'initial poor' clearly had the lowest gains with a 122% proportionate increase in benefits for the bottom quintile and a 131% increase for the second lowest. The 'new poor' had the highest proportionate gains (137% and 155% increase respectively), while the 'long-term poor' fall somewhere in between (130% and 139%). Per capita amounts increased for all groups but the share of the population receiving transfers declined slightly overall (22 to 20 percent), as did the proportion of the poor receiving them by all three definitions. The evidence does not suggest that the poor were targeted by the program expansion.
Were changes in transfers responsive to poverty-related shocks? Table 9 the highest initial consumption and the highest gains to consumption were beneficiaries compared to 34 percent of the worst off in both respects. Furthermore, if anything, the per capita transfers to participants inc rease with initial and rising welfare. The smallest amount went to the most needy. These specific programs appear unresponsive to shocks.
As discussed in section 2 (and to be further discussed in section 7), location may be an important factor in the determination of program participation. Possibly the absence of a pattern in Table 9 arises from variation across geographical areas that is obscuring patterns within them. To test this, a dummy variable indicating whether transfers were received in 1998 was regressed against initial (1993) per capita consumption and the change in per capita consumption (1993 to 1998) . A linear probability model was used and run with and without commune effects. With commune effects, there is no sign of transfers responding either to initial consumption or to changes in consumption. Without commune effects, the results suggest that transfers respond perversely to initial consumption ( β =1.12e-8, t=2.52) and not to shocks (similarly to Table 9 ). This suggests that it is households in richer communes that primarily benefit from these transfers.
It is of further interest to examine what role transfers played in the impressive
reduction in poverty that occurred over this period. The panel structure is now exploited to evaluate how well the safety net performed dynamically including how well it protected against poverty distinguished from how well it promoted out of poverty, following the approach proposed in Ravallion, van de Walle and Gautam (1995) . In comparing joint distributions of consumption expenditures, such as with and without policy changes, the approach tests a policy's ability to protect the poor (PROT) and its ability to promote the poor (PROM). 19 It indicates which distribution offered more protection and which offered more promotion and allows a calculation of the statistical significance of the difference. Table 10 presents the baseline joint distribution of consumption in the two years.
Households are classified into four groups according to whether they were poor or nonpoor in both years, and whether they escaped or fell into poverty over the period. There is evidence of a large fall in poverty: 26 percent of the population escaped poverty, 5 percent fell into poverty, 34 percent were persistently poor and 35 percent were never poor. There is considerable persistent poverty.
What is the effect of transfers on poverty? To answer this question, it is necessary to simulate the counterfactual joint distribution without transfers; as in the static incidence calculations, this is done by subtracting half the transfers received in each respective year from consumption in that year. The simulated joint distribution is given in Table 14 show that outlays would be sufficient to bring 17 percent of the poor (7% of the population with a standard error of estimate of 0.4%) out of poverty. Only 3 percent of the non-poor would have fallen into poverty(2 % of the population, s.e.=0.2%).
Finally, going back to the concerns of Table 8, Table 15 presents the joint distribution of the incidence of proportionate gains in social incomes. When ranked by their 1998 welfare, large gains are again apparent for the non-poor. The new information here is that within the non-poor, the largest gains went to those who were initially poor.
Once again, the evidence suggests very poor performance on protection.
Poverty fell quite dramatically in Vietnam between 1992/93 and 1998, but social insurance, social subsidy and scholarship income transfers appear to have had negligible bearing on that outcome. Nor did they fulfill a safety net role in protecting those who faced falling living standards during this period. Part of the reason is low overall spending on these programs. However, the simulations above suggest that poor targeting is a fundamental problem, as are low total outlays.
Geographic Targeting
One possible explanation for the picture that has emerged so far may be the narrowness of the welfare indicator that has been used. Consumption expenditures per capita may simply be too narrow a welfare metric to reveal the underlying pro-poor targeting. Programs may well respond to on-the-ground definitions of welfare that are considerably more complex than per capita consumption.
Another possible explanation is that, given Vietnam's institutional arrangements for delivering social welfare programs, non-welfare dimensions, such as politicogeographical dimensions, may largely determine whether transfers reach the disadvantaged. This section explores these possibilities.
Poor communes have greater needs but richer communes can better afford poverty-related programs. The latter may also be better at implementing programs and reaching their poor. One means of equalizing resources is through the central government's national programs. An obvious question is to what degree redistribution occurs through these programs. Are the limited resources transferred from the national programs to the local level targeted to poorer communes? It is not possible to answer this directly since there is no way to figure out whether a sampled household benefits from a national program from the VNLSS (with the exception of school fee exemptions for which a benefit amount is not identifiable). However, incidence at commune level is observed in the commune level data for employment generation, poverty alleviation, education and culture, infrastructure development, public health, environment and other programs; similarly, household participation at commune level is observed for microcredit, school and health fee exemptions, tax exemptions, training and disaster relief programs. Most of these programs are probably centrally mandated 'national programs', although they can not be identified specifically. Table 16 Are poor communes more likely to have poverty programs? Table 16 suggests that the answer is yes. In general, poorer communes appear to have both more poverty related programs and a greater share of their populations participating. But the exceptions are interesting. The percent of households benefiting from occupational training is highest in rich communes. Education, employment generation, and environmental programs are all most common in the richest communes. There appears to be capture of skills and employment related schemes in richer communes perhaps because they are already well-endowed with the benefits offered by the other programs. Overall, the incidence across communes is redistributive in that there is a greater concentration of programs in the poorest communes. However, it is also true that programs are spread around quite widely geographically.
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The above results tell us nothing about the benefits to households from living in a 20 Again, the empirical evidence does not support the claim that truly poor communes are being targeted much more so than others. This could reflect deficiencies in the government's identification of poor communes (see Minot and Baulch 2001) , or point to the inefficiency of geographical targeting due either to fundamental heterogeneity among communes or alternatively, to targeting not actually being implemented.
commune with a program or from being among the beneficiaries. For this we need to turn to household level data. Linking up household and commune information further allows an exploration of the importance of geographical location to participation in programs. For example, how do the poor in poorer communes fare compared to the poor in richer communes? To what degree does a poor household's geographical location determine whether and how much it benefits from assistance programs? Do poor households in rich communes do better than in poor communes? Are there signs of better targeting when more is spent overall in a location (see Ravallion 1999) . Tables 17 and 18 attempt to examine these issues by looking at the distribution of beneficiaries and of social income payments (as reported at the household level) across the populations of poor, middle and rich communes ranked into national terciles of per capita consumption net of transfers .   Table 18 clearly shows that, not only is more being spent per capita overall in richer communes, but much more is also going to the poor. Total mean per capita payments in the richest communes are more than double that in the poorer communes.
Mean per capita amounts going to the poor are 136 percent higher. There are signs of better targeting in better-off communes. Social insurance and social subsidies largely drive these results. Although Table 17 indicates that more of the poor live in households that participate in programs in poor communes than in rich communes, the per capita amounts received by the poor in the latter dwarf the former. They account for 7.1 percent of household expenditures compared to 4.3 for the bottom tercile in the poorest communes. Although small, outlays from the poverty alleviation fund tend to be concentrated in poor communes and on the poorest. The targeting differential, given by the difference between the mean expenditures going to the poorest 50 percent of the population to that going to the top 50 percent are 1202, 1210 and 161 for poor, middle and rich communes respectively.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
The paper's results reveal little sign of targeting to poor people or poorer communes in terms of their levels of living measured by consumption. If anything, transfer receipts rise with consumption per person, though there are signs that the share of social incomes in consumption falls with consumption, implying that transfers reduce inequality. Nor is the existing system effective in protecting households who are vulnerable to falling living standards. Household payments and contributions also appear to be regressive.
The current system suffers from the lack of national norms for identifying the poor consistently across regions; the lack of survey and other instruments with which to consistently measure and monitor local needs and program performance; a lack of integration and coordination between sub-programs with well-defined and universal rules for implementation at the local level; insufficient welfare maximizing redistribution of resources across space so that everyone is treated equally regardless of where they reside;
and a lack of resources and attention to helping households and communities deal with covariate risk. Progress in these areas could lead to significant improvement in social protection for Vietnam's poor and vulnerable households.
In terms of funding and priorities, it is clear that the primary focus of HEPR continues to be micro-finance and infrastructure development. The potential immediate significance of the HEPR lies in the possibility of greater consistency in priorities and norms, better monitoring of outcomes, much needed integration and coordination between programs, better coverage of the poor, and redistribution towards poorer and less administratively capable provinces. But, here too, there has been little discernible progress since the HEPR's inception.
While the HEPR concept offers the potential for significant improvements in the safety net, the Government of Vietnam faces a number of difficult challenges. The very principles on which the current highly decentralized, community-based assistance and safety net system is built are threatened by the emerging market economy. In particular, increasing mobility  important to a well-functioning market system  dictates a thorough rethinking of the safety net's foundations. Household mobility renders community level identification and targeting of the poor less effective and is likely to make the mobilization of community resources for helping the poor more difficult. The high level of decentralization inhibits the country's ability to provide adequate protection from covariate risks, which, in turn, appear to be on the rise as a result of environmental destruction. Adequately addressing this challenge, and the consequently widening urbanrural and regional inequalities, will require a greater level of risk pooling nationally through greater reliance on state-contingent redistribution mediated through the center.
Important political hurdles can also be expected in efforts aimed at reallocating resources to better protect Vietnam's poor and vulnerable.
Geographic targeting is a widespread practice and is generally assumed to work well when there are geographical concentrations of poverty and identification of the poor is possible at sufficiently disaggregated level. However, it may well be that poorer areas are less capable of reaching their poor well and /or implementing poverty programs than their richer counterparts. The paper finds that across Vietnam's communes, more is spent relatively and absolutely on the poor in richer communes. This is likely to reflect the large differences in resources across regions. More research is needed to understand whether it also reflects weaker capacity for reaching the poor. However, in the absence of a reform of the fiscal redistributive system  whereby the center's redistributive process promotes an equalization of resources all the way to the commune level  if one is asking where resources will have the greatest impact, it is not clear that one sho uld not target better off communes rather than poorer ones.
The data do not allow us to identify whether funding comes from the national or local levels. Past evidence seems to indicate that existing national resources are relatively well targeted spatially at provincial level, but that the redistributive effect is mitigated by the distribution that then occurs within provinces. Although the paper cannot throw light on this question, it does show that the combination of funding and implementation mechanisms results in poor areas and people getting less than better-off areas and people. This suggests the need for more compensatory mechanisms from the center which could take the form of more money, better incentives for fiscal redistribution at the local level, more monitoring of central norms or administrative constraints on local discretion in the implementation of centrally mandated social welfare programs. The rural/urban breakdown follows the urban92 definition. Individuals are ranked into national population quintiles based on household per capita expenditures net of half of transfers receipts. The amounts represent household self-reported income received from the government during the last year expressed on a per capita basis across the population of each quintile. Social insurance refers to pensions and disability payments. Social subsidies consist of transfers to families of war martyrs, disabled veterans, and from social organizations or production facilities. These come from the Social Guarantee Fund for Veterans and War Invalids and the Social Guarantee Fund for Regular Relief. The poverty alleviation income represents all funds received from programs associated with the government's poverty alleviation policy. NGO income is assistance received from private and international NGOs. The rural/urban breakdown follows the urban92 definition. Individuals are ranked into national population quintiles based on household per capita expenditures net of half of transfers receipts. Some aggregation has been made across reasons given for receiving a fee exemption: disabled and orphan; ethnic minority and boarding student in minority area; parent is deceased soldier, seriously wounded soldier or disabled government cadre; the remainder includes parent is farmer and 'other'. The rural/urban breakdown follows the urban92 definition. Individuals are ranked into national population quintiles based on household per capita expenditures net of half of transfers receipts. Dong amounts are self-reported household payments to local government or any of the numerous associations (mass organizations) during the last year expressed on a per capita basis across the entire quintile population. The value of contributions in labor time has been imputed using values of 10,000 and 15,000 Dongs per day worked in rural and urban areas respectively, and added to cash contributions to the labor fund. Note: The population is ranked into poor, non-poor groups based on actual per capita expenditures at each date and cross-tabbed. The first number in each cell gives the percentage of total population who were in that row's poverty group in 1993 and that column's group in 1998. The number in parentheses inside the table gives the proportion of each row's population that is in each column's group in 1998 or the transition probability. Note: The population is ranked into poor, non-poor groups based on actual per capita expenditures for 1998 and the simulated 1998 distribution had the five transfers identifiable in 1998 been distributed per capita only to the poor and cross-tabbed. Co mmunes are ranked into three equal groups based on the mean per capita expenditures net of half of social incomes of their population. All the other information is based on the commune level data. a: Refers to exemption or reduction of production/business taxes; b: Refers to occupational and agricultural technology training; c: refers to economic and infrastructure development investments. Communes are ranked into three equal groups based on the mean per capita expenditures net of half of social incomes of their population. The rural population is ranked into population terciles. The number of sample households in each tercile is given in parentheses. 
